In accounting for the rather gloomy trend of the aid effectiveness literature over the last few years, one explanatory strand has been fiscal, suggesting in particular that aid flows in weak states have tended to erode the taxbase and the structure of institutions. We pursue this idea, tracing the link from politics to domestic tax effort and then using the influence of this on expenditure to explain the leverage of aid. Thus, we argue that in the long run, tax effort determines the effectiveness of aid, and this relationship operates simultaneously in some countries with the negative link in the opposite direction, from aid to domestic tax effort, as observed by Bräutigam and Knack (2004) and others. We find that tax effort and the ability of the state to diversify its taxation structure are important determinants of long-term growth and aid effectiveness, and in our model, we find that overall aid effectiveness is, in a 3SLS model, weakly positive and significant, echoing the findings of Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2009) and Minoiu and Reddy (2010) ; however, these findings are not robust when retested using the GMM approach …/.
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favoured by the literature. A more robust finding, and a key message for policy, is that a broadening of the tax structure in low-income countries is crucial in order to enable those countries to escape from the 'weak state -low tax trap', and to make aid more effective.
Introduction
For all the idealism, and increased aid levels, aroused by the Millennium Development Goals and Make Poverty History campaigns, the literature on the effectiveness of aid flows has entered a gloomy phase. The most up-to-date and comprehensive recent study of aid effectiveness, the paper by Rajan and Subramaniam (2008) finds no significant association between aid and growth in any region, whatever the lag-structure that is used. This finding casts a shadow over the more optimistic results achieved by, for example, Hudson and Mosley (2001) , Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Clemens, Radelet and Roodman (2005) , all of which suggest that long-term aid flows, at least since the 1990s, had a positive impact on the performance of developing economies. Explanations of this poor performance contain two major strands. One, favoured by Rajan and Subramaniam themselves (2009) , invokes the purely economic mechanism of 'Dutch disease': aid flows buoy up the exchange rates of recipient developing countries, in a manner which blunts their competitiveness and their growth. Another, associated with Bräutigam and Knack (2004) , draws a contrast between short-term and long-term impacts, and suggests that the long-term institutional impact is a negative one, which over time cancels out any positive short-term impact. The reasons for this negative institutional impact are multiple, and include a tendency for aid flows to be used corruptly in some recipient countries (Knack various) and a tendency for aid flows to undermine tax effort (Moore 1999; Gupta et al. 2003) , leading in turn to lower public expenditures and lower growth possibilities.
In this paper, we pursue the second of these two explanatory strands--i.e., the hypothesis that aid damages institutions--with particular reference to fiscal institutions. Initially, we return to the so-called 'fiscal response' literature of the 1980s, which linked aid effectiveness to fiscal performance. We then build on this by showing that the composition of public expenditure and taxation, as well as their level, is an important determinant of aid effectiveness. Finally, we seek to understand the political economy underlying the choice by the state of an inclusionary, rather than an exclusionary, fiscal strategy, which, we argue, plays an important part in determining the composition of taxation and expenditure. Throughout, our concern is to improve aid effectiveness if that is possible--with a focus on fiscal approaches to that objective--and only secondarily to measure the size and significance of the aid effectiveness coefficient.
The argument: fiscal determinants of aid effectiveness
Three decades ago, in Mosley (1980) , we showed that fiscal performance was a key element in determining aid effectiveness over the previous two decades. We defined fiscal performance not only in terms of the level and productivity of public expenditure, but also in terms of the willingness of governments to finance that expenditure out of taxes rather than simply out of aid flows, on the grounds that this is a key determinant of the stability and effectiveness of public expenditure. In that paper, we defined willingness to finance public expenditure out of taxes as ' incremental tax effort', or the degree to which public revenue as a share of taxation rises over time, and argued that it was a key element in making public expenditure and thence aid more effective. Incremental tax effort is not an easy thing to generate in a poor country with a weak state, as politically in the short term it is much less costly to finance additional expenditure by asking donors for more aid than by raising taxes. This poses the obvious risk of 'bottom billion' countries being caught in a low-tax, weak-governance vicious circle, a dilemma explored in particular by Moore (1999) .
However, for those states who manage to escape this vicious circle, including the countries of the Far East in the 1970s and 1980s, Russia and many countries of Eastern Europe in the 1990s and now the 'proto-developmental states' of Africa, such as Uganda and Ghana, in the 2000s, there are important rewards to increasing public revenues in terms of state-building. One of them is that one source of potential political instability, which is volatility in aid disbursements 1 (Fielding and Mavrotas 2008; Bulir and Hamann 2008; Hudson and Mosley 2008 ) is diminished in proportion as the ratio of tax revenue to aid revenue can be increased. However, a second and more fundamental advantage of building up the taxbase to finance public expenditures is that, in proportion as citizens are free to express their wishes, governments are put under pressure to improve public services--a pressure that is absent in the case of aid-financed expenditures since taxpayers, unlike aid recipients, only get what they pay for (Haggard and Kaufman 2008: 356; Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008) .
2 Thus, our main story is that, because expenditure financed out of taxation is, in the long run, more effective than expenditure financed out of aid flows, aid becomes more effective in proportion as it incentivises, rather than substituting for, the creation of tax revenue, and if we can understand the political process by which this happens, we will better understand the macro-effectiveness of aid.
A first step in explaining this political economy is to see that achieving a long-term increase in tax revenue requires an evolution of tax structures. Many of the poorest countries have inherited, almost unaltered from colonial times, a structure of taxation which is highly dependent on foreign trade, and this is inhibitive of development, both because this category of expenditure does not grow as fast as world trade or expenditure as a whole, and because commodity trade is more subject to violent and unexpected fluctuation than other taxbases (Greenaway and Milner 1991) . Therefore, development of tax revenue, and of the economy as a whole, may depend on the elite being motivated to diversify the taxbase. Uganda is a notable example. In 1986, 85 per cent of its public revenue was derived, not just from trade taxes, but from export taxes on coffee alone. As a consequence, most other commodity exports were wiped out, the ratio of taxation to income was only 5 per cent, and public expenditure was heavily constrained and aidreliant. By 1995, the export tax had been eliminated in favour of import duties, a VAT and various user charges had been brought in to augment revenue, the ratio of taxation to GDP had increased to 12 per cent, and Uganda had become one of the fastestgrowing economies in Africa. Table 1 , which describes the dynamics of developing country tax ratios between 1990 and the present, illustrates both the fundamental problem and the possibility of escape from it. As illustrated by Moore in the 1990s, a majority of low-income countries have been unable to raise their tax ratios over this period--and have thereby been tightly constrained in terms of the volume and the effectiveness of their expenditure--whereas a majority of middle-income countries have been successful in escaping from this constraint. However, nine low-income countries (the 'off-diagonal' cases listed in the bottom left-hand corner of Table 1 ) have managed to spring the trap. Since, on our hypothesis, being able to do this holds the key to aid effectiveness, it is of obvious interest to understand what distinguishes the political economy of the countries which have been able to escape from those who have not.
Thus, we see the likelihood of escape from the 'low state capacity, low growth' trap as crucial to aid effectiveness, and this likelihood as being determined by the balance, within the recipient elite, between narrowly patrimonial (rent-seeking) elements whose focus is on short-term survival, and elements whose focus is on the long term and on the putting together of a broad-based, inclusive 'developmental coalition'. What determines the likelihood of the latter outcome? On this issue, our understanding consists more of case-studies and improvisations rather than a rigorous body of knowledge. However, basing ourselves mainly on case study material such as that contained in Besley and Cord (2007) and Mosley (2012) , we offer four hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1
Inclusiveness (specifically in the allocation of fiscal resources) often comes about because exclusiveness has repeatedly failed to deliver growth or political stability, and the fundamental institutional changes associated with its advent are often associated with a learning experience such as a period of chronic political instability which convinces the elite that 'we cannot carry on like this if we are going to progress'. We can return again to the example of Uganda, whose National Resistance Movement, from the early 1990s onward decided that fundamental fiscal reforms were required to establish the state on a stable and inclusive basis, which it saw as a precondition for economic growth over the long term, 3 and it did this because it became convinced from the bloody experience of the years 1972-85 that that experience would recur unless long-term reforms of state-building, of which an overhaul of both tax and expenditure were a part, were undertaken. However, Ghana, Mozambique and Rwanda in the 1990s, Sierra Leone at the turn of the millennium, and more recently Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Indonesia in the wake of the shocks inflicted by the 'East Asian crisis' in the early 2000s, are all good examples of regimes which also learned from misery and fundamentally modified their political systems and specifically their fiscal regimes in a more inclusive direction to head off a return to political chaos. The first four of these, being low-income countries, are countries which escaped from the 'tax trap', as can be seen from Figure 1 . Although some of these cases, notably Bolivia since 2006, are quite recent and untried, it is at least a valid working hypothesis that one factor making for strong, inclusive states is a trauma that makes the practices which led to previous instability appear patently unsustainable.
Hypothesis 2
More inclusive and durable political settlements (including those that make an escape from the 'tax trap' possible) are often facilitated by credible signals of equity and fair dealing emanating from the elite. One way of making such a signal is to make an explicit redistributive linkage between taxes and expenditure, 4 as in the case of taxes on mineral exports linked to payments to pensioners and the unemployed in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador) . This model has now also been applied also in Africa, for example by means of windfall taxes in Zambia (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009) Ghana; for another African case, Mauritius, see Bräutigam in Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008: Chapter 6) .
5 Such institutional reforms may be useful in representing taxation as an element in a social contract with the public, in which the public is invited to participate for the common good of building up public services, rather than a coercive and unjust process (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and Moore 2008) and thereby widening the tax net and making an escape from the tax trap feasible, as has occurred in--amongst the 'off-diagonal' countries of Table 1 --Ghana, Bolivia and Zambia. 6 Another way of sending such a signal is to reform the constitution with a view to its delivering greater social justice, which has occurred in Ghana (early 1990s), Argentina and Ecuador (early 2000s), and Bolivia (2005-08 ). Yet another is to alter the mix of public expenditure, as well as taxation, in a direction that achieves greater equity and reduces military centrality (i.e., not just the share of military expenditure but the role of the military in government). We call this the 'social efficiency wage' approach, because it reduces social instability through the payment of a higher social wage, just as in labour economics, the payment of a higher private wage (known as an 'efficiency wage') increases the stability and efficiency of the labour force (Stiglitz 1976; Hudson, Lenton and Mosley 2011) .
Hypothesis 3
The social and political relationships that form between aid donors and recipients are crucial to determining possibilities for tax diversification and tax yield--and thence for determining expenditure and aid effectiveness. As acknowledged by Bräutigam and Knack (2004) , these relationships can be both creative and destructive of long-term fiscal capacity, but the balance of their exposition is towards an emphasis on the destructive element in the story, through costs imposed by fragmentation of aid effort between donors, through leakages of aid flows into corruption, and through the moral hazard problem that, as they put it, 'aid might make governments less likely to put in place the policy framework, local funds, and trained personnel needed for development' (Bräutigam and Knack 2004: 263) , which is in essence the problem already highlighted earlier, that if recipient motivation is 'wrong', aid flows may substitute for tax effort. This is particularly likely to be the case if the recipient, for geopolitical or other reasons, knows that the donor's threat to withdraw aid is not credible.
7 However, the other side of this coin is that if recipient motivation is developmental, or becomes so as the result of an evolution of trust-relationships between donor and recipient (Mosley and Suleiman 2006; Mosley 2012 : chapter 7) aid may be used to derive ideas which enable the recipient to diversify his taxbase, and to hire personnel which enable those ideas to be implemented and the underlying problem of state weakness tackled at root, as occurred in (to discuss only cases in the bottom left quadrant of Table 1 ) Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Ghana between 1990 and the present.
building' motivation among the recipient elite: the chemistry took time to evolve, in the cases mentioned, and of course in some cases it did not evolve at all. 9 The challenge which we confront in the next section is to represent the evolution of that chemistry empirically.
Hypothesis 4
Finally, the scope for varying tax and expenditure levels is of course influenced by the state of the macro-economy: when the fiscal balance becomes unsustainable, there is more pressure to raise taxes.
Thus the fundamental process which we are seeking to model is that the four political economy factors described above (at least) determine the ability of tax structures to achieve exit from the 'low-income, weak state trap', tax revenue contributes to the determination of public expenditure, and the pattern and level of public expenditure Figure 1 Causal links in a model of aid, expenditure and taxation 9 Critical elements in the evolution of this chemistry of trust-relationships are (i) the willingness and ability of recipients to send signals of willingness to implement 'fundamentals', in particular a coherent poverty reduction strategy programme, (ii) the willingness of donors to indulge slippage on some performance criteria as long as these 'fundamentals' were complied with, and (iii) the quality of the underlying personal relationships and networks of communication, which helped to determine (i) and (ii) . For the basic argument underlying the argument about trust presented here, supported purely by African illustrations, see Mosley and Suleiman (2006) and Mosley (2012: chapter 7) . For a Latin American discussion of the social and cultural factors underlying the decision to pay tax, including trust in the tax system, see Bergman (2003) . determine the impact of aid on growth. (To understand the impact of aid on poverty, we need also to factor in the poverty-leverage of public expenditure.) This sequence is portrayed graphically in Figure 1 .
We can now embed these ideas within the enormous, and still growing, literature on aid effectiveness. This literature in the 1980s quickly became aware that the effectiveness of aid depended on the use which the public sector as a whole, and not just aid-financed activities, made of it (Mosley, Hudson and Horrell 1987; Boone 1996, etc.) . However, the main axis of this research quickly became fixated on public expenditure rather than on the financing of the public sector as a whole, and in particular, of course, on the problem of fungibility--of whether aid flows tended to encourage or to restrain a movement of that expenditure into more productive uses (McGillivray and Morrissey 2001) . The issue of whether public expenditure was being properly spent by aid recipients then became interlocked with the controversy over whether policies of globalization and openness were crucial to effective resource allocation in the public and private sector and thence to aid effectiveness, as contended by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and refuted by Hansen and Tarp (2001) . In the excitement of discovering--sadly only for a short time--that a secular improvement in aid effectiveness was taking place, the analytical spotlight became focussed on annual growth data and on the short-term influence of policy on these; and some of the longterm processes which underpinned that improvement, in particular the hesitant emergence of 'developmental states' in some parts of the developing world, were in our judgment overlooked. This is natural if one's focus is on the short term, since an increase in taxation, all else held constant, automatically and tautologically lowers income. However, in a longer-term perspective where state expenditures are seen as dependent on the structure of institutions, including revenue collection, which supports those expenditures, those institutions cannot be overlooked. 10 The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the performance of the fiscal system in this long-term sense, incorporating the role of revenue-collecting institutions, contributes to long-term aid effectiveness.
Empirical strategy
The essential story presented above (as Figure 1) contains three basic steps: the political economy variables discussed above determine tax structure and the ability of tax revenue to grow; tax revenue plus other causes determine expenditure; and these fiscal variables condition the state's ability to deliver, and thence the effectiveness of overseas aid. The model to be estimated consists of these three basic steps, plus a fourth equation in which aid is endogenous; these correspond to the links represented as (1) through (4) on Figure 1 . Our specification of these building-blocks is:
Tax revenue
In essence, the ability of the state to develop its tax revenue, as discussed above, is determined by its ability to diversify out of the strait-jacket of taxes on trade, and more broadly by its ability to confront rather than be bought off by powerful rent-seekers who 10 'Large-scale aid and debt relief cannot work without a good fiscal system' (Addison, Roe and Smith 2006: 1). pay no tax. We specified above three elements in the process by which elites may be motivated to escape from the tax trap: a political trigger motivating them to find a longterm way out of the trap, a relational environment which provides them with the technical means for doing so, and an atmosphere of justice which provides a climate in which social contracts can be built and an institutional gateway for doing this. Thus:
where D is a measure of tax diversification, representing the potential for escaping from the low tax/weak state trap, and M, I and S are the political-economy factors which, as discussed above, make such escape possible by providing incentives to the diversification and inclusivity of the tax system. We specify these factors as: M = 'learning from misery variable' = 1 if political instability in previous year, 0 otherwise, representing the ability of 'traumas' as described above to induce a broadening of the revenue base; I = 'inclusiveness variable' denoting proxies for public trust in tax system, namely; GI = Gini coefficient of (vertical) inequality; HI = indicator of (measures for overcoming) horizontal inequality; L = indicator of links from taxes to public expenditure; S = social capital: the relational environment between aid donors and recipients, which influences the size and stability of aid flows. This is influenced by: IMF = the volume of IMF and World Bank loans, whose technical assistance acts as a vehicle for providing recipient governments with administrative capacity and ideas, and in particular ideas about how to broaden the taxbase 11 , and also TR ('trust') = a measure of the level of trust, or effective working relationships, between aid donors and recipients. We proxy this in two alternative ways: a measure of the frequency of interruption of programme lending (budget support loans) by Bank and Fund to recipient countries, and a measure of forgiveness by the Bank of slippage on performance criteria imposed by those institutions.
Thus the complete tax equation is:
T/Y=constant+b 1 D+b 2 M+b 3 I(G,HI,L)+b 4 S(IMF,TR 1 ,TR 2 ) (1)
Public expenditure
By the argument presented above and in Haggard and Kaufman (2008) , the ability of the state to expand its expenditure is heavily dependent on the taxbase. Expenditure is also constrained by cyclical factors, as the world economy is discovering at the moment, when budget deficits are high, public borrowing cannot be increased without increasing the costs of borrowing and putting credit ratings at risk. Haggard and Kaufman also suggest that the expenditure ratio, especially the ratio of social expenditure to GNP, will be determined by the degree of openness of the economy and by the degree of voice and accountability in the political system. Thus the complete expenditure equation is 
Aid, growth and other measures of wellbeing
Aid effectiveness now enters the story directly. Aid is included in the growth Equation (3) as an independent variable in a fairly standard new growth theory equation, including in particular for ease of comparison, the standard controls used by Rajan and Subramaniam (2008) and other recent contributors to the aid effectiveness literature, including initial income, openness and political shocks. (A variable lag operator appears against the aid term, since the length of the lag from aid to growth is one of the key issues of contention related to whether 'aid works'. The one innovation in (3) is a compositional variable which we refer to as the social efficiency wage, the proportion of public expenditures that is devoted to mitigating social tensions, and thereby protecting the state, as discussed earlier. We define this (Hudson, Lenton and Mosley 2011) as the share of public expenditure committed to functions which increase social equity: education, health, housing and social protection, less military expenditure. The social efficiency wage is thus a mechanism somewhat analogous to the social justice term in the tax Equation (1): it sends a signal of the interests with which the government is identified, and of the degree of justice, or otherwise, with which the elite intends to arbitrate between those interests. Our hypothesis is that a higher social efficiency wage will induce a greater sense of social justice, and by thereby moderating the likelihood of political instability (Alesina and Perotti 1996) increase investment and growth.
Other measures of well-being (for example poverty) can be incorporated by expressing them as functions of growth and other variables seen as influencing the poverty elasticity, such as measures of social equity:
Finally, aid is itself endogenous -in particular to income levels(Y/N), as most donors seek to concentrate aid on the poorest people and country size. Other standard instruments such as population (N) are also included.
A list of all the variables in the model and their sources is set out in Table 2 . Although this model is portrayed as a linear sequence, there are numerous linkages going in the opposite direction: i.e., tax receipts and aid itself are both endogenous to growth. Hence, as normal, we estimate the system (1)-(3) by instrumental variables methods, using both 3SLS (in order to portray the separate interactions within the model) and, for ease of comparison, the same GMM specification as used by Rajan and Subramaniam (2008) to estimate their model. Table 3 presents the results from the three-stage least squares specification, which has the merit of portraying all of the causal relationships as separate equations. This suggests (Equation 1) that tax structure (the share of trade taxes in total tax revenue), the dummy variable for interruptions in the flow of loans from the IMF and World Bank (considered as a measure of the quality of trust-relationships between donor and recipient institutions) and, most of all, the flow of loans from the IMF and World Bank itself, considered as a proxy for technical assistance in the provision of both ideas for tax design and in laying the groundwork for the administration of new taxes, 12 exercise a significant influence on the level of tax effort (measured here as the tax/GDP ratio). Tax effort in turn (Equation 2) exercises significant influence on the ratio of expenditure to GDP, and within this system of relationships, aid has a weakly significant (at the 10 per cent level) influence on growth (Equation 3) and a stronger 'positive' influence 13 on the infant mortality measure of poverty (Equation 4). In the light of the emphasis of recent literature on capturing the lags in the system, it is necessary to examine the relationship between growth and lagged aid, as well as current aid. Here the news is less good: when aid is lagged, the positive correlation between aid and growth, although still present, loses its significance. 13 Aid, in Equation 3a , is negatively correlated with infant mortality, and therefore its influence is 'positive' in the sense that it improves wellbeing.
14 Within an equation structure identical to (1) through (4) above, the growth equation (3) GDP growth = constant + a 1 (GDP growth lagged) + a 2 (aid) + a 3 (tax/GDP ratio) +a 4 (total government expenditure) + a 5 ( loans from World Bank/IMF) + a 6 (polity) + a 7 (1988 per capita income) + a 8 (secondary school enrolments + a 9 (social efficiency wage). Table 4 illustrates the results from estimating Equation (5). We use a 5-year lag, and we also experiment with the consequences of improving the aid impact model by incorporating aid squared as an indication of diminishing returns to aid, as notably done by Hansen and Tarp (2001) . Both the Sargan-test and the AR2 test are comfortably passed in these runs of the model. However, if these results are compared with those from Table 2 , the significance of aid in relation to growth disappears, and indeed turns negative when aid squared is included in the specification. The significant coefficient of tax (and one of its causes, World Bank and IMF loans), however, remains. No other explanatory variable in (5) is significant in those cases where the diagnostic tests are passed, in both the 3SLS and these GMM equations.
Conclusions
We have examined aid effectiveness through the lens of the link from tax structure, to tax effort, to expenditure possibilities, to growth. Our interpretation has not really advanced from that put forward thirty years ago as Mosley (1980) --namely that for poorer developing countries, tax effort, as an important indicator of institutional structure, is an important element in determining the ability of a country to transform itself into a developmental state, and thence in determining that country's capacity for growth; and that it is therefore vital, if one is to understand the relative effectiveness of aid in relation to growth, to examine the linkage going from tax structures to growth to aid, as well as the linkage going in the reverse direction from aid to tax-structures, as examined, for example, by Bräutigam and Knack (2004) . In our view, the impact of aid on tax is much more complex than the simple crowding-out effect visualised by Bräutigam and Knack when they say (2004: 256) , 'large amounts of aid and the way it is delivered make it more difficult for good governance to develop… because of the way aid affects institutions in weak states'. Our view is that sometimes this is true and sometimes it isn't, depending on the underlying political economy of the recipient state and the chemistry that develops between the donor and the recipient, but especially in the case of the IMF we have econometric support for our view that technical assistance in laying the administrative base for an expansion of the taxbase may in many cases be critical for an expansion of tax capacity. The relationship, in other words, is a two-way, interactive one, and its outcome is determined not only by the Bräutigam-Knack 'crowding-out' effect, but also by the magnitude of two more positive impacts, namely the direct effect of technical assistance by donors into tax design and the indirect effect of aid on tax revenues via growth.
Our findings on the aid-growth linkage itself are non-robust, generally suggesting a modestly significant linkage (at the 10 per cent level, better in the case where poverty is taken as the relevant wellbeing indicator), between aid and growth if a 3SLS estimation method is used (and thereby supporting the findings of Arndt, Jones and Tarp and Minoiu and Reddy), but generally suggesting an insignificant linkage if the generally favoured GMM method of estimation is used. These are only preliminary results, and experimentation with a wider range of specifications is emphatically required. But the findings so far provide firm support for the idea that if we are to improve aid effectiveness, serious study of the strategies used by those countries so far used by poor countries who have been successful in escaping from the 'low-tax trap' (as listed for example in Table 2 ) is strongly recommended.
